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As TIF: Missouri’s Misguided Attempt to
Reform Tax Increment Financing Deepens
the Education Resource Gap
Mark Ficken†
Introduction
As the old adage goes, “the road to Hell is paved with good
intentions.” So too is with Tax Increment Financing (TIF) funding.
Local municipalities intended that TIF would grant them greater
control of their own economic development. 1 Municipalities could
incentivize development of so called “blighted” land without raising
taxes.2 As federal funds were no longer flowing to cities, the idea of
local control grew in popularity in the 1970s and 1980s, 3 and fortynine states and the District of Columbia currently have TIFauthorizing statutes.4 On its face, TIF appears to accomplish its
stated goal of economic development—TIFs have been used to build
affordable housing,5 revitalize neighborhoods,6 and develop
†. J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. Journalism
& Political Science 2017, Northwestern University. I’d like to thank Prof. Jill
Hasday, Anna Barton, and the JLI staff for their help making my Note as strong as
possible. I’d also like to thank my parents, brother, and friends for enduring my
many rants, complaints, and explanations as I wrote this Note. And, as always, to
Missouri.
1. Jeffrey I. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS 182, 182 (Helen F. Ladd & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1998).
2. Id.
3. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND
IMPACT 15, 18 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
4. Council of Dev. Fin. Agencies, TAX INCREMENT FINANCE STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN STATE TIF STATUTES 2 (2015) [hereinafter
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT].
5. See Andrea Elson et al., Using TIF to Provide Affordable Housing: A Fiscal
Impact Analysis of the King Park TIF District in Urbana, Illinois, in TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 193, 193
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (analyzing the use of TIF to redevelop
an area in Urbana, Illinois).
6. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2017 TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI:
LOCAL TIF PROJECT INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL DATA 607 (2018) (stating
development at St. Charles Plaza at Noah’s Ark would be “for high density planned
mixed use and commercial purposes”).
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entertainment complexes.7 In the ensuing half-century, however,
systematic flaws stemming from the vagueness of TIF statues led
politicians of all political stripes to call for reform.8
Missouri’s TIF statute was passed in 1982 and most recently
amended in 2016.9 In 2018, the Missouri General Assembly
considered a slate of commonplace and inventive reforms in
Missouri House Bill 1236 (H.B. 1236). 10 This bill died with the end
of the 99th General Assembly, but the reforms were reintroduced
with minor changes as Missouri House Bill 31 (H.B. 31) at the start
of the new session.11 The most inventive proposed reform, H.B. 31,
would amend Mo. Stat. 99.845(5) to allow school boards to “elect to
have fifty percent of the portion of property tax revenue allocated to
the school district by a county or municipality excluded from a tax
increment allocation financing project . . . .”12 In essence, it would
allow schools to opt-out of a proposed TIF district, thus withholding
part of their budget from the TIF district pool.13 This seems
reasonable; who doesn’t like stable, adequate public-school funding?
However, a deeper look into the potential consequences of this
reform shows it only exacerbates the problems this reform is meant
to fix. School-opt out could effectively veto any TIF proposal, or force
developers to craft their proposals solely with the school district in
mind.14 In addition, it would further fracture regional development
at a time when many agree regional unity is necessary. 15 Finally,
this opt-out power varies drastically depending on the financial

7. Id. at 265.
8. See, e.g., LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, IMPROVING TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING (TIF) FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 38 (2018) [hereinafter LINCOLN
REPORT] (outlining the reform efforts regarding Chicago’s use of TIF districts).
9. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1(2) (West 2016).
10. H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 99.485(5) (Mo. 2018).
11. Compare H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018), with H.B.
31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
12. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(c)(5) (Mo. 2019).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Roxie Hammill, Shawnee Mission School Board Allows
Meadowbrook TIF, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.kansascity.c
om/news/politics-government/article38071458.html [https://perma.cc/GV8A-ZJXM]
(detailing how a TIF proposal was approved only after several concessions were made
to the local school district).
15. See, e.g., Tim Logan, Area Stunts Growth by Feeding on Itself, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/areastunts-growth-by-feeding-on-itself/article_644ee8ee-d6da-57fc-9714-a7fb95619fa1.h
tml [https://perma.cc/MUM4-ZH6K]
(recounting the St. Louis region’s propensity to detrimentally compete for
development deals).
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stability of each school district.16 One of the few states with a
similar TIF statute as Missouri’s proposal is bordering-state
Kansas,17 where the mere threat of veto has radically changed TIF
proposals.18
Giving schools the chance to opt-out of TIF districts allows
affluent schools to reap the benefits of TIF developments without
the pain of a frozen budget during the life of the TIF. Meanwhile,
distressed schools, like those in the Normandy School District, have
no such luxury, needing to immediately attract any TIF
development without regard for future economic impact. As such,
this Note argues that the reforms proposed in H.B. 31 will
accelerate the known consequences of the current TIF statute in
Missouri. The Note will compare TIFs from the Kansas City,
Kansas metropolitan region and the St. Louis, Missouri
metropolitan region to show the potential impacts of school opt-out
on the TIF decision-making process as well as any potential school
resource impacts.
This Note begins with a brief explanation on the focus on
Missouri. Section II provides a primer on the history of TIF districts
and how TIFs operate, while Section III introduces the proposed
reforms within H.B. 1236 and H.B. 31 and places them in context
with Kansas’ existing TIF statute. Section IV argues school opt-out
provisions incentivize schools to only approve TIFs that benefit
them and why that could actually lead to long-term economic
distress and disparity. Section V argues that, even if it were prudent
to grant schools veto power, school opt-out further and
unnecessarily complicates the geopolitical tension of the St. Louis
metropolitan region. Section VI briefly discusses the role of state
aid in mitigating the losses suffered by schools while a TIF district
is active and Section VII presents an alternative solution to the
problem school opt-out attempts to solve.
This Note proposes two reforms. The first modifies and
expands the use and power of the county TIF commissions
introduced in 2008, by redistributing who chooses members of the
commission and weakening municipalities’ ability to veto their
decision. The second implements school opt-out, albeit in a
significantly narrower sense than that included in H.B. 31, by only
allowing schools to opt-out of primarily residential TIF districts.

16. Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Tax Increment Financing and
Expenditures: The Case of Iowa, 9 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 515, 536 (2014).
17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018).
18. Hammill, supra note 14.

Education

110
I.

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

Why Missouri?

The Midwest in general, with the exception of California, more
eagerly designates areas as TIF districts than any other region in
the United States.19 While Missouri does not utilize TIFs nearly as
much as neighboring Illinois, 20 there are two characteristics to
Missouri that make it more interesting to study. First, the St. Louis
metropolitan area is wildly fragmented, which presents unique
challenges to any TIF statute. 21 At the same time, Missouri’s TIF
statute currently typifies many across the country. Like many
states,22 one way to achieve TIF district designation in Missouri is
through a definitive finding of blight.23 In addition, Missouri
authorizes these districts to last up to 23 years, 24 which is near the
length of an average TIF district in the United States.25 This
tension between the unique fragmentation of the St. Louis
metropolitan region and a relatively generic TIF statutory
framework better exposes the limitations and flaws of TIFs in
general and makes it easier to hypothesize any statutory change’s
impact to the region.
Second, and more importantly, Missouri legislators have
expressed a sustained interest in reforming Missouri’s TIF statute,
making it far more likely for Missouri to experiment with new
proposals and mechanisms to accomplish TIF’s goals.26 The
legislation at the heart of this Note is merely an example of this
willingness to experiment.27 The ultimate question is whether the
experiment will prove successful or disastrous. In the case of H.B.
31, it is likely to be the latter.

19. Tanvi Misra, The Trouble with TIF, CITYLAB (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2018/09/the-trouble-with-tif/569815/ [https://per
ma.cc/N4ZL-6HKF].
20. Id.
21. Susan G. Mason & Kenneth P. Thomas, Exploring Patterns of Tax Increment
Financing Use and Structural Explanations in Missouri’s Major Metropolitan
Regions, 20 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 203, 207 (2018).
22. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
23. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 208.
24. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(3) (West 2016).
25. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
26. E.g., H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); H.B. 1236, 99th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 99.485(5) (Mo. 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1(2)
(West 2016).
27. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
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II. A Brief Primer on TIF Districts
Before assessing how H.B. 31 would change Missouri’s TIF
statute, it is important to understand the policy rationales behind
TIFs as well as Missouri’s current statutory framework. Post-World
War II, states desiring to redevelop urban areas and facilitate the
expansion of the burgeoning suburbs encouraged land development
through creative means. The states drove development of this
solution, as the austerity measures of the Great Depression and
wartime years led to a decline in federal funds for municipal
economic development.28 In 1952, California, seeking the
“elimination of blight and blighted areas” without resorting to the
controversial and oft-litigated eminent domain, passed the first TIF
statute.29 In the decades that followed, forty-eight states other than
California and the District of Columbia passed TIF statutes, 30
primarily in response to a lack of federal funding. 31 These TIF
authorizing statutes vary broadly, but each utilize the same
primary mechanism to fuel economic development.32
A.

How Do TIFs Work?

TIFs are a classic redistribution scheme—municipalities
preemptively take from government agencies and other services
that receive property tax revenues (police, fire departments, and
school districts) and funnel that prospective revenue into a fund to
offset the cost of an approved development project.33 In practice, this
redistribution is far more complex and depends on the standards
and requirements put in place by each state’s TIF authorizing
statute. For the sake of this section, however, many of these
complexities are irrelevant and add confusion. 34 Instead, this
section provides a basic explanation on how TIF districts operate,
and, because the focus of the Note is a proposed Missouri reform,
28. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 205.
29. Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and
Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 164 (1998).
30. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
31. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 205.
32. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 17.
33. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7.
34. The scope of this Note is only on a proposed TIF reform in Missouri that
would allow school districts to opt-out of proposed TIF districts. The subtle nuances
that govern TIF districts and other agencies receiving property tax revenues are
beyond that scope. This Note will discuss the role of state aid to school districts in
TIF districts in Section VI.
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this explanation utilizes the applicable Missouri statutes, namely
the Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. 35
TIFs operate on two basic premises: (1) that property value
will always increase and (2) economic development on that land
accelerates that increase in value.36 Typically, property taxes are
collected and divided among the various departments and districts
in which the property resides. 37 When a municipality passes an
ordinance that designates a new TIF district, several things happen
to that property tax revenue. First, a new district is drawn that is
significantly larger than the approved redevelopment project. 38 At
that time, the property value of all the land comprising the new
district is assessed.39 This assessment determines the “base value”
of the TIF district.40 During this assessment, the municipality also
determines the amount of property tax that base value generates
and predicts the natural increase of property tax revenue over the
life of the TIF.41 Then, any additional increase in property tax
revenues beyond the predicted increase over the life of the TIF
district (or, the incremental value) is set aside into a separate
fund.42 This fund reimburses some or all of the redevelopment
costs.43
For example, St. Charles, Missouri approved a TIF on the site
of a former restaurant and hotel in 2007.44 This TIF was to develop
a multi-use entertainment district with apartments and
restaurants.45 At the time the TIF was designated, the land valued
$6.5 million.46 Ten years later and halfway through the project, the
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

MO. REV. STAT. § 99.800, et. seq. (West 2016).
LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 17.
LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Chapman, supra note 1, at 183.
DENNY COLEMAN & BRIAN MURPHY, BETTER TOGETHER, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2014).
43. Herein lies one major structural flaw with TIFs. In order for the TIF district
to create enough of an incremental value to pay off the cost of the redevelopment, the
land being redeveloped must already be of some value. This structural flaw, as
Section IV explains, funnels TIF districts into affluent communities and
neighborhoods.
44. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 6, at 607–08.
45. Rachel Kaatmann, Decision Looms for Noah’s Ark Project TIF in St. Charles,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 9, 2006), https://www.stltoday.com/suburbanjournals/decision-looms-for-noah-s-ark-project-tif-in-st/article_f6a8958c-e408-59e9b356-7e447dd54c45.html [https://perma.cc/JV5V-UYTG].
46. Behind the Scenes: Economic Development in St. Charles, ST. LOUIS
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land is valued at $88 million. 47 All the increased property tax
revenue caused by the rise in property value is placed into the TIF
redevelopment fund to help finance the rest of the development. In
addition, Missouri law allows up to fifty percent of all sales tax
revenue generated by new economic activity in the TIF district to
be placed into this redevelopment fund.48
TIF districts last a long time. In Missouri, they can last up to
twenty-three years.49 During those twenty-three years, the base
value never changes and slows the economic growth of other
districts, like schools, that depend on property taxes. 50 These
districts fail to see any of the increased revenue that comes with
TIF redevelopment.51 Even worse, schools may see increased
pressure on their existing budget if more individuals move into their
district boundaries because of the TIF, thus increasing enrollment
without increasing their budget.52
TIF districts were and remain popular among municipalities
for two main reasons. First, they allow significant local control over
economic development projects.53 This local control allows
municipalities to aggressively compete for new property and sales
tax bases.54 Second, and perhaps more importantly, they are a
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/201
7/04/21/behind-the-scenes-economic-development-in-st.html [https://perma.cc/2HH
N-F3D7].
47. Id.
48. The statute provides that
fifty percent of the total additional revenue from taxes, penalties[,] and
interest which are imposed by the municipality or other taxing districts, and
which are generated by economic activities within the area of the
redevelopment project over the amount of such taxes generated by economic
activities within the area of the redevelopment project in the calendar year
prior to the adoption of the redevelopment project by ordinance, while tax
increment financing remains in effect, [taxes exempt from this provision],
shall be allocated to, and paid by the local political subdivision collecting
officer to the treasurer or other designated financial officer of the
municipality, who shall deposit such funds in a separate segregated account
within the special allocation fund.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.845.3 (West 2016).
49. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(3) (West 2016) (“The estimated dates, which shall
not be more than twenty-three years from the adoption of the ordinance approving a
redevelopment project within a redevelopment area . . . .”).
50. Chapman, supra note 1, at 183.
51. Id.
52. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
53. Rachel Weber et al., The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on School District
Revenues: Regional Variations and Interjurisdictional Competition, 40 ST. & LOC.
GOV’T REV. 1, 28–29 (2008).
54. Id.
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golden combination of what politicians love: they provide typically
popular economic developments (who doesn’t love a new grocery
store or movie theater?) without raising taxes. 55 Yet TIFs also are
inherently paradoxical. In order to see a high enough return on
investment, municipalities must select projects not because the
land is truly blighted but because the project promises some
glistening new retail development. The City of St. Louis alone has
more than 100 active TIF projects, and more than $2 billion of
property tax revenue has been diverted into TIF-funded
redevelopment projects.56 This activity is impressive considering
the relative-youth of Missouri’s TIF authorizing statute.57
III. Missouri Loves Company: Establishing the Link
Between Missouri and Kansas
This Section is divided into two subsections. The first
introduces the reforms within H.B. 31. The second explains why
Kansas provides an ideal analogue to Missouri, and therefore how
example TIFs in Kansas can be used as evidence that school opt-out
accelerates the already widening resource gap.
A.

H.B. 1236, H.B. 31, and Missouri’s Most Recent TIF
Reform Effort

In March 2018, the Missouri General Assembly considered a
new slate of TIF reforms, focusing on three proposals. These
reforms were later reintroduced with minimal changes in January
2019 as H.B. 31. First, the proposal would cut the duration of TIF
districts, limiting them at fifteen years, instead of the current
twenty-three years.58 Second, it would modify the timing of the
required notice and comment period—allowing residents within the
proposed TIF district thirty days to voice concerns. 59 Finally, it
would implement the reform that is the topic of this Note: school
opt-out. H.B. 31 would modify Mo. Stat. section 99.845 to allow
applicable school boards to vote, with a two-thirds majority, to
55. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 184 (describing TIF funding as “selffinancing”).
56. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that, as of 2016, $2 billion of
public tax dollars were diverted to developers through TIF).
57. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 6, 1–2.
58. Compare H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019), with MO.
ANN. STAT. § 99.845.10(5) (West 2016).
59. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019).
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withhold half of their property tax revenue from the proposed TIF
district.60 The previous iteration of this bill, H.B. 1236, was
introduced with bipartisan sponsors and was voted out of committee
before the bill died on the floor of the Missouri House of
Representatives.61
The reforms in these bills are fairly popular. 62 More
specifically, it was popular among everyone but the cities of St.
Louis and Kansas City.63 St. Louis even sent a lobbyist to the state
capitol in Jefferson City to argue against the bill.64
B.

Jayhawkers and Bushwhackers; Not So Different
Anymore

This Note uses TIF districts in both Missouri and Kansas to
add color to each of the supporting arguments of this Note’s thesis.
These illustrative cases serve as easy-to-understand examples of
arguments that delve into the intricacies of municipal land use. In
order to determine whether school opt-out actually accelerates the
resource gap among schools, it is important to eliminate as many
variables as possible. Kansas, whose TIF statute includes school
opt-out, is a perfect candidate.65
Missouri and Kansas have not always been the best of
neighbors.66 Yet, the two states are sufficiently analogous
demographically and economically to be a useful comparison. 67
60. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(c)(5) (Mo. 2019).
61. H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2018) (showing the bill
passed committee vote 8-2), https://house.mo.gov/BillContent.aspx?bill=HB1236&co
de=R&style=new&year=2018 [https://perma.cc/5N9D-8BLK].
62. Sarah Fenske, TIF Reform Gets a Thumbs Up in House Committee,
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2
018/03/29/tif-reform-gets-a-thumbs-up-in-house-committee [https://perma.cc/2733-Q
FAY].
63. Id.
64. This action was not well received. Sarah Fenske, St. Louis is Fighting TIF
Reform in Jefferson City. That’s BS, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/03/21/st-louis-is-fighting-tif-reform
-in-jefferson-city-that-should-make-us-mad [https://perma.cc/8M3Z-2B6H].
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018).
66. Missouri residents, hoping to make Kansas a slave state, stormed Kansas
when Kansas’ status as a free or slave state was to be determined by popular
sovereignty according to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The ensuing deadly conflict
between the Bushwhackers (Missourians) and the Jayhawkers (Kansans) is known
as Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Kansas, KAN. HISTORICAL SOC’Y. (Sept. 2016),
https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/bleeding-kansas/15145 [https://perma.cc/3QPH-L
8HC]. Today this bloody conflict manifests itself through the (usually) bloodless
rivalry between the University of Missouri and the University of Kansas.
67. Each state’s demographics are similar. U.S. Census QuickFacts on the

116

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

While some individual Missourians and Kansans may disagree, the
U.S. Census Bureau lists both states as falling within the
Midwestern region of the United States. 68 Both states place a heavy
emphasis on agriculture.69 In addition, each state’s demographics
are similar.70 The political leanings of each state is not a major
factor in this Note’s analysis, as TIF funding and reform is
traditionally a bipartisan process.71
C.

The Relevant Difference Between Missouri and Kansas’
TIF Statutes

Understandably, Missouri and Kansas utilize different
procedures in designating TIF districts. However, only one of these
differences is relevant. Under the procedures in Mo. Stat. section
99.820, there is no opportunity for the school district to weigh in on
the municipality adopting a new TIF district. Once the municipality
adopts the TIF proposal, the school district’s funding is simply
frozen for the life of the TIF.72
Not so in Kansas. Under Kan. Stat. section 12-1771(d), school
districts have thirty days after the required public hearing to veto
any proposed TIF district.73 Ostensibly, this veto signals that the
populations of Kansas and Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/ks,mo/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/8N5G-ZAZ6]. The biggest
difference between the two states is Missouri has a larger percentage of Black
residents (11.8%) than Kansas (6.2%), whereas Kansas has a larger percentage of
Latino residents (11.9%) than Missouri (4.2%). Id. This difference likely has little
impact on the thesis, provided the demographics of the sample school districts align.
The states are similar economically as well. The average income of Kansas is $55,477
while in Missouri it is $51,542; further, the poverty rates are 11.9% and 13.4%
respectively. Id.
68. CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www2.censu
s.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf [https://perma.cc/P643-YV6
M].
69. In a ranking by the Department of Agriculture of the fifty states by cash
receipts by commodity, Kansas ranks 7th while Missouri ranks 12th. Cash Receipts
by Commodity, State Ranking, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17844 [https://perma.cc/D4AE-ZH3Z].
70. U.S. Census QuickFacts on the populations of Kansas and Missouri, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ks,mo/PST045218 [ht
tps://perma.cc/8N5G-ZAZ6].
71. See H.B. No. 1434, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016) (showing the bill
passed 145-12 in the House and unanimously in the Senate).
72. Mo. Stat. section 99.820 outlines the procedures for a municipality to adopt
a TIF proposal after the required public hearing in Mo. Stat. section 99.825. MO.
ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1 (West 2016).
73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018) (“No privately owned property subject
to ad valorem taxes shall be acquired and redeveloped under the provisions of K.S.A.
12-1770 et seq. [which outline the designation of the TIF district], and amendments
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school district feels “that the proposed redevelopment district or
bioscience development district will have an adverse effect on
such . . . school district,” but there is no requirement that the school
district disclose the reasoning behind their decision. 74 While the
phrasing of the Kansas statute and H.B. 31 are different, their
impact should be similar.75 The means of vetoing may be different,
but a veto is still a veto and there is still no TIF district.
H.B. 31 allows the school district to prevent the inclusion of
fifty percent of their property tax revenue from inclusion in the
proposed TIF district.76 While this allowance is not the same as an
explicit veto, the effects are the same. School districts tend to
receive more property tax revenue than any other service, 77 and,
withholding such a substantial chunk of potential TIF funding
would be detrimental to any TIF project. This result means that,
while H.B. 31 does not explicitly give school districts the power to
veto proposed TIF districts, it implicitly gives them that power.
Therefore, while the power given to school districts under Kan. Stat.
section 12-1771(d) is different than those given to school districts if
H.B. 31 were enacted, the effect is the same. The impacts of this
kind of power are relatively unknown. The rest of this Note uses
examples of Kansas school districts merely threatening to veto TIF
districts to illustrate potential impacts in Missouri.
IV. School Opt-Out and H.B. 31 Incentivize Schools to
Reject TIFs that Don’t Increase Property Tax Revenue
It should come as no surprise that certain kinds of
municipalities pursue different kinds of TIF projects. 78 After all, a
major rationale behind TIF districts was to allow municipalities to
thereto, if . . . the board of education levying taxes on such property determines by
resolution adopted within 30 days following the conclusion of the hearing for the
establishment of the redevelopment district or bioscience development district
required by subsection (b) that the proposed redevelopment district or bioscience
development district will have an adverse effect on such . . . school district.”)
74. Id.
75. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018), with H.B. 31, 100th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019).
76. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019).
77. Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax School Funding Dilemma, LINCOLN
INST. LAND POLICY 4 (2007), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/t
he-property-tax-school-funding-dilemma-full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8MD-6VMB].
78. Sarah L. Coffin, The Promises and Pitfalls of TIF in the St. Louis
Metropolitan Region: A Look at Neighborhood Disparities, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 57, 77–78 (2013).
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pursue hyper-local funding to meet their individual needs in the
face of declining federal money for redevelopment.79 This difference
in the type of TIF pursued by municipalities is caused primarily by
a difference in motive.80 Distressed municipalities tend to focus on
single-use housing or residential redevelopment while more
affluent municipalities focus on entertainment and multi-use retail
developments.81 This difference makes sense. Affluent
municipalities need no help getting middle- and upper-class
residents to move within their borders. The allure of prestige and
strong schools (and racially motivated homogeneity) draws these
families like flies to a light.82 There is an economic interest in
fighting off the smallest whiffs of blight or economic distress.
Instead, these municipalities want to keep their residents (and
their money) within their borders when they go grocery or clothes
shopping, or when they decide to go to the movies or out to eat.
A.

The TIF Approval Process Already Favors the Voices of
the Wealthy

The Missouri TIF statute puts in place a lengthy process to get
a proposal approved. This process is remarkably similar to formal
notice-and-comment rulemaking.83 Unfortunately, this process
already favors affluent municipalities. When a developer in

79. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 182.
80. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78.
81. Id. at 73 (“The more distressed municipalities do appear to focus more of their
TIF efforts on projects that promote residential uses, yet they also focus considerable
attention to single use retail.”). Coffin’s 2013 article compared the City of St. Louis’
use of TIF with the surrounding St. Louis County. Id. at 78. She found that the City
focused on housing redevelopments while the County focused on retail as “all
communities around the region tend to depend on retail sales as a primary economic
development strategy.” Id. at 73. One of Coffin’s conclusions was that “this finding
indicates that the city of St. Louis is not competing with the surrounding
municipalities in Missouri for TIF projects and that there is an opportunity for
regional cooperation.” Id. at 78. The impact of factionalism in the St. Louis region on
TIFs is discussed in detail in Section V.
82. Alana Semules, White Flight Never Ended, ATLANTIC (July 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/3
99980/ [https://perma.cc/BU6P-ZSKP] (“‘People know what is a white suburb and
what is a black suburb,’ [Daniel] Lichter says. ‘Whites are still attracted to those
suburbs that are white.’”).
83. Generally, under the guidelines set forth in Section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, agencies implementing new regulations or rules must: (1) provide the
public notice of a proposed regulation or rule through publication, (2) accept written
and, potentially, verbal feedback from the general public regarding the proposed
rule, and (3) publish of the final rule at least thirty days before the rule is
implemented. Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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Missouri wants to begin a TIF-based redevelopment project, the
developer presents a proposal to the municipality. 84 This proposal
outlines a basic description of the program, the proposed boundaries
of the district, estimated costs, outside funding that might be
necessary, and the expected duration of the TIF district. 85 In
addition, the plan must include a “cost-benefit analysis showing the
economic impact of the plan on each taxing district . . . . The
analysis shall show the impact on the economy if the project is not
built, and is built pursuant to the redevelopment plan under
consideration.”86 In theory, municipalities must demonstrate the
TIF will actually increase property tax revenue in a worthwhile
way. Finally, the proposal must explain why the TIF is necessary
and what qualifies the land for TIF redevelopment under a “but for”
test.87 This is notoriously easy to meet. All that must be
demonstrated is that the specific developer presenting the proposed
development would not undertake the project without the TIF
funding.88
i.

The Missouri Blight and “But For” Tests Present No
Barrier to a TIF’s Approval

As referenced above, TIFs necessarily contain a paradox. They
were originally used as a tool in the fight against blight, but the
principles underlying each TIF district’s success requires
municipalities to consider them primarily as a tool of economic
development.89 Because of this paradox, the administration of TIFs
are rife with opportunities for fraud and abuse.90 Much of the
literature on Missouri’s TIF laws bemoans the almost non-existent
blight and “but for” requirements.91 Recent TIFs in the St. Louis
84. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1 (West 2016).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 99.810.1(5).
87. Id. § 99.810.1(1) (requiring that the redevelopment area take place on a
“blighted” area where economic redevelopment would not “reasonably be anticipated
to be developed without the adoption of tax increment financing.”).
88. Joe Wilson, Given a Hammer: Tax Increment Financing Abuse in the St.
Louis Region, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 91 (2014).
89. Chapman, supra note 1, at 183.
90. See id. at 185–88 (listing four potential issues that arise when municipalities
use TIFs for economic development).
91. See Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for Blight
and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1050–51 (2001); Gil Williams,
Specificity, Blight and Two Tiers of TIF: A Proposal for Reform of Tax Increment
Financing Law, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 272–74 (2013); Wilson, supra note
88, at 91–92.
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region include the building of high-end lofts with an attached Whole
Foods in the trendiest area of St. Louis City,92 a shopping center in
an upper-middle class suburb,93 and the aforementioned
entertainment, dining, and shopping destination complete with
luxury apartments in St. Charles County. 94 Drive twenty minutes
away from any of these developments towards North St. Louis
County and you enter the boundaries of the Normandy School
District.95 Normandy made national news in the wake of the
Ferguson unrest as the poster district for the resegregation of
American public schools after the district lost its accreditation.96
While Normandy has regained provisional accreditation, 97 clearly
TIFs are not being used to correct truly blighted areas and instead
used to benefit already wealthy communities.

92. Tim Bryant, St. Louis Panel Approves TIFs for Apartments and Mercedes
Dealership, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.stltoday.com/new
s/local/metro/st-louis-panel-approves-tifs-for-apartments-and-mercedesdealership/article_1a0c57f8-93d2-56c8-bb6c-1f65f52f948b.html [https://perma.cc/X9
5N-4W8B] (“Bruce Mills, the company’s president, told commissioners the City Walk
on Euclid project will have 176 market-rate apartments on six floors above the Whole
Foods grocery and a 458-car garage.”).
93. Laurie Skrivan, City of Manchester TIF Incentives Attract Wal-Mart, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 22, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/c
ity-of-manchester-tif-incentives-attract-wal-mart/image_1015d609-1794-59a1-b19c6b84dd554902.html [https://perma.cc/F9KA-7RT4] (“[Walmart] chose to reopen a
larger store about a mile westward in the new Manchester Shopping Center due to
the tax increment financing incentives (TIF) offered by the City of Manchester.”).
94. Kaatmann, supra note 45 (“Plans include an 18-story high-rise residential
complex, an outdoor ice rink, a movie theater, a 150-room upscale hotel, restaurants
and a parking garage that could include 1,827 spaces.”).
95. School Districts St. Louis County, Missouri, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO. (Sept.
2013), https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/maps%20and
%20gis/maps%20for%20download/School%20Districts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRJ5-L
D59] [hereinafter School District Map].
96. Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, The Continuing Tragedy of
Ferguson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/fergusonschool-segregation [https://perma.cc/R2HW-85LC] (“The Normandy school district
from which Brown graduated [the police killing of Michael Brown sparked the
Ferguson protests] is among the poorest and most segregated in Missouri. It ranks
last in overall academic performance. Its rating on an annual state assessment was
so dismal that by the time Brown graduated the district had lost its accreditation.”).
97. Kristen Taketa, Normandy Schools Get Good News–And Provisional
Accreditation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.stltod
ay.com/news/local/education/normandy-schools-get-good-news-and-provisionalaccreditation/article_693d9b70-e821-5b76-9709-ca2e1c9d2901.html [https://perma.c
c/8CNL-UPVF] (revealing continuing issues with the district as “[l]ast school year,
34[%] of Normandy students scored proficient or advanced on state tests in English
and 19[%] did so in math, up from 24[%] and 12[%] respectively in 2015. Its four-year
graduation rate increased from just 53.6[%] in 2013 to 81[%] this year.”).
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Approved TIFs can be controversial, and this controversy
frequently leads to litigation. However, Missouri courts at every
level tend to defer to the judgment of the municipality. 98 More
extreme decisions claim that courts are not permitted to overturn
the decision of the municipality unless the decision was
“arbitrary.”99 There are procedural requirements before
municipalities can establish TIF districts. 100 Unfortunately, the
decision of each municipality is de facto unreviewable by Missouri
courts provided they follow the statutory requirements. 101 This
incentivizes bad behavior by developers.102 Instead of utilizing TIFs
for their original purpose, developers can seize upon the
“meaningless” blight standard and argue some of the most affluent
and developed regions are actually blighted.103
Some authors also focus on Missouri’s use of a but-for test
when analyzing potential TIFs. This “but for” test, as explained
above is fairly straightforward. The evidence needed to satisfy this
test include: analyses of potential returns on investment, evidence
of prior redevelopment efforts that stalled, or any other financial
records or evidence that indicate the property is unlikely to be
developed.104 Like the definition of blight, this fairly simple but-for
test is open to abuses that the Missouri courts have yet to
address.105 As Reinert noted, this standard makes it difficult to
prevent a municipality from enjoining a TIF as “the plaintiff would
98. JG St. Louis West LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (“In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we make our own independent
determination of whether the legislative body’s decision was fairly debatable.”)
(emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In, Inc., 812
S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (“Judicial review is limited to whether the
legislative determination was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad
faith, or whether the City exceeded its powers.”). The issue of judicial review of each
municipalities’ TIF approvals is not addressed in H.B. 31. See H.B. 31, 100th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
100. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.825 (West 2016) (outlining the procedural
requirements for establishing a TIF district in Missouri).
101. Id. (omitting a provision for challenging the municipality decisions); see also
Williams, supra note 91, at 265 (“The court must confine itself to determining if
procedural mandates have been observed, necessary findings have been made, and
whether the municipality’s ordinances are arbitrary . . . .”).
102. Id. at 273.
103. Id. at 272 (quoting Reinert, supra note 91, at 1050); see also supra text
accompanying notes 91–94.
104. Reinert, supra note 91, at 1048.
105. JG St. Louis West LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001); Cory C. VanDyke, Fields of Dreams: The Expectation and Common Reality of
Tax Increment Financing, 79 UMKC L. REV. 791, 805 (2011).
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have to show that there was some evidence of fraud or misdealing,
or that the finding of blight is ‘so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
amount to an abuse of the legislative process.’” 106 Thus, changes to
TIF standards will not come from the courts; they must come
through from the Missouri General Assembly.
These lax blight and “but for” standards, in addition to
economic considerations baked into TIFs, lead developers to forgo
the areas TIF laws were meant to help and instead focus on areas
with the largest return on investment. 107 This abuse in turn
prompts developers in affluent municipalities to focus on retail
while economically distressed municipalities focus instead on
housing.108 This effect is not necessarily bad; after all, the point of
TIFs was to allow local control over economic development. 109
Developers look to find the best return on their investment and,
naturally, focus on retail development.110
An example of an affluent municipality focusing on
entertainment and multi-use developments is the Meadowbrook
Redevelopment Project in Prairie Village, Kansas. 111 Meadowbrook
was originally a golf course, but in 2016 was designated a TIF
district.112 The approved project would redevelop the old golf course
into a regional “park,” “luxury” housing ranging from single-family
homes to assisted living for the elderly, and 5,000 square feet of
commercial space.113 The designation of the Meadowbrook
Redevelopment TIF was remarkably controversial and, as
explained below, the school district for the proposed TIF district

106. Reinert, supra note 91, at 1048–49 (quoting Tierney v. Planned Indus.
Expansion Auth. of Kan. City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. 1988)).
107. Wilson, supra note 91, at 90 (citing Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban
Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 305, 317 (2004)).
108. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78.
109. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 15.
110. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 217 (stating the majority of TIFs in the
St. Louis suburbs tend to be retail establishments).
111. See Meadowbrook Redevelopment, CITY OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KAN.,
https://www.pvkansas.com/city-government/projects/meadowbrook-redevelopment
[https://perma.cc/33DH-2E89].
112. Id.
113. David Twiddy, Prairie Village Clears Path Toward Meadowbrook Park
Reality, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/c
ommunity/joco-913/northeast-joco/article73883787.html [https://perma.cc/2HXD-CS
RR] (discussing and detailing the City Council’s approval of the Meadowbrook TIF).
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threatened to veto the project.114 The project was eventually
approved and the district was created.115
A natural reaction to this lax blight and “but for” standard is
to call for either greater judicial oversight of the TIF approval
process or a better statutory definition of what blight actually
means. These options may be beneficial and would potentially
remedy some of the issues identified in this Note. However, this
Note does not advocate for this reform for two reasons. First, the
focus of this Note is not on the maligned blight and “but for”
standard, but rather on the impact of the proposed school opt-out
provision in H.B. 31. Second, and more importantly, this Note
advocates for more politically practicable reforms that remedy some
of the issues created by these lax blight and “but for” standards. 116
Small municipalities and local control are deeply imbedded into the
United States’ system of governance,117 and maintaining that
system while advancing the need for regional governance is a tricky
balance. The proposals advocated by this Note attempt to maintain
that balance.
ii.

The County Commission Weighs In and Is (Potentially)
Ignored

After meeting the incredibly easy blight and “but for”
standards as mandated by Missouri state law, certain counties
appoint a commission with at least twelve members to conduct a
study of the proposal.118 The statute attempts to allow interested
parties to have representation on the commission. For example, two
members of the commission are appointed by the school boards
within the proposed TIF district. 119 This commission then conducts
a public hearing with specific notice requirements. 120 At the hearing
anyone can submit written or oral comments regarding the proposal

114. Hammill, supra note 14 (“Superintendent Jim Hinson told board members
he would not recommend a veto of the financing . . . .”).
115. Id.
116. See discussion infra Section VII.
117. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (“By shrinking the population
denominator, boundaries give those remaining in the numerator that greater share
of power and influence in the polity seen as crucial in increasing the propensity to
participate. Boundaries, in other words, are what make possible the enhanced sense
of citizen-effectiveness so essential for participation.”).
118. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.3 (West 2016).
119. Id. § 99.820.3(1)(c).
120. Id. § 99.825.1.

124

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

before the hearing and the hearing can be extended as long as
necessary.121
After the hearing, the commission votes on the proposal. 122
However, a rejection at this point is not binding. 123 Finally, the
municipality, through an ordinance, either denies the request or
approves it and establishes a new TIF district.124 Once this district
is approved, more than one redevelopment project may be
implemented within the approved district without undergoing the
notice and comment period again.125
iii. H.B. 31 Overinflates the Importance of School Boards in
the TIF Approval Process
Under H.B. 31, this process changes. After the municipality
approves the TIF, the school board would have sixty days to
determine whether they want to withhold fifty percent of their
property tax revenue from the approved TIF district. 126 This vote
must pass the school board with a two-thirds majority and may
occur any time before the municipality approves the TIF district. 127
H.B. 31 grants school boards far too much power in the TIF
approval process and layers another approval vote over an already
contentious and drawn out process. It is important to proceed with
caution when spending public funds, but too much caution leads to
gridlock and indecision. This Note instead proposes a different
solution that would increase school district influence without
allowing the school board to unilaterally kill a TIF proposal they do
not like. School boards currently appoint two seats to the county
commissions, which range from nine to twelve members depending
on the size of the municipality. 128 Instead, this Note argues, they
should appoint four members to adequately represent the stake
school districts have in any new TIF district. In addition, some of
these seats should be filled by school districts classified as
“distressed” by the Missouri General Assembly. This proposal gives

121. Id.
122. Id. § 99.825.2.
123. Under section 99.825.2, if the commission rejects the proposal as a whole or
in part, the municipality can override the commission with a two-thirds vote. Id. §
99.825.2.
124. Id. § 99.820.1(1).
125. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11.
126. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(5) (Mo. 2019).
127. Id.
128. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.2(1) (West 2016).
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schools more influence but keeps that influence in proportion to the
potential impact any TIF has on their district.
B.

Affluent School Districts Will Focus on TIFs that
Increase Tax Revenue

Retail developments have a greater chance of increasing
property tax revenue than residential developments. 129 School
districts know that. Municipalities know that. Developers know
that. Allowing school districts to opt-out of TIF districts and
effectively kill any project they do not like would allow school
districts to assert their interests against the interest of the
municipalities and developers. They could use their ability to veto
or opt-out of a TIF development to allow only TIF developments that
increase property tax revenue, and, by proxy, school district
revenue, to a level of their choosing. That is not to say that school
districts looking out for their interests would be an altogether bad
thing. What it does mean, however, is developers and
municipalities—faced with a school district threatening to opt-out
of a potential TIF district—must craft their proposals with
increased emphasis on the needs of a school district.
Again, that is not necessarily a bad thing. Quality education is
critical and a common criticism of TIF districts is that they
unnecessarily strain the resources of schools without producing
much benefit.130 What is more concerning is, as multi-use retail
based TIFs tend to focus on more affluent areas, only affluent school
districts have the option to assert their power and force negotiation
for a more favorable TIF package. Simply put, it is a tool for the rich
alone.
Distressed municipalities have the opposite problem of
affluent municipalities. They need residents, or, at the very least,
they need to maintain their population in the face of families
moving—typically to the more affluent municipality down the road.
Of the two models of TIF development, the rationale used by
distressed municipalities is more in line with the original intent of

129. See Rachel Weber, Equity and Entrepreneurialism: The Impact of Tax
Increment Financing on School Finance, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (arguing
that municipalities use “entrepreneurial strategies” to focus primarily on priorities
outside of traditional “redistributive functions” like housing).
130. See Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Tax Increment Financing and Education
Expenditures: The Case of Iowa, 9 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 515, 536 (2014) (finding that
“greater use of TIF is associated with reduced education expenditures.”).
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TIF funding.131 TIFs that include affordable housing help attract
new residents and provides a tax revenue increase, albeit smaller,
that can stave off further distress.
With the understanding that more economically distressed
municipalities focus on residential TIFs, how then would allowing
school districts to opt-out of proposed TIFs accelerate the resource
gap between these schools? Two reasons: first, successful retail
developments raise property tax revenue more than the building of
an apartment or single-family home.132 Second, because distressed
municipalities are focused on increasing their population with the
approval of residential development TIFs, distressed school district
enrollment would increase, and this increase could outpace any
increase in revenue the school would receive when the TIF
expired.133 More affluent schools with stagnant enrollment will
have more resources due to increased property taxes, while
distressed districts will enroll more students with less of a property
tax increase simply based on the type of TIF each area pursues.
Some states, like Minnesota, allow school districts to formally
veto a proposed TIF district if the proposed district involves housing
redevelopment.134 A similar scheme can be implemented in
Missouri as well. As explained above, TIFs for housing development
are primarily centered in distressed municipalities. 135 This means
a provision modeled after Minnesota’s would give the power to optout of TIFs primarily to distressed school districts—the reverse of
what might happen if H.B. 31 were enacted. This reversal also
prevents the widening of the resource gap. Instead of funneling
much needed resources into a TIF district, the Normandy School
District, for example, could use that money to provide counseling to
students suffering the effects of trauma, grant stability to students
constantly in transition—be it from home to home or district to
district—and continue increasing the academic standards of the
district. These are all goals articulated by the district. 136 Tailoring
a school opt-out provision to only apply to TIFs traditionally within
131. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 182.
132. See Weber, supra note 129, at 620.
133. See id. at 634.
134. MINN. STAT. § 469.176, subd. 4c(d)(3) (2019).
135. Coffin, supra note 78, at 77–78.
136. See Charles J. Pearson, Opinion, In Normandy District, All Our Children
Deserve the Best, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 20, 2018), https://www.stltoday.co
m/opinion/columnists/in-normandy-district-all-of-our-children-deserve-the-best/
article_17c18eb8-b3d1-5ef3-9c64-d6f00ebfff71.html [https://perma.cc/CE8G-UNU4].
Pearson is the superintendent of the Normandy School District. Id.
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their borders allows them to stabilize their financial resources and
pursue those goals.
TIFs are, and always have been, about power and the transfer
of power to different communities. Originally, TIFs took power
usually reserved for the federal government and returned it to state
and local governments.137 Local governments controlled their own
redevelopment plans without much external influence. In the
ensuing half-century, however, this power has been co-opted by
wealthy developers looking to funnel TIF funds into grand multiuse redevelopments in already economically stable and affluent
areas.138 This practice runs afoul of the original intent of TIF
funding and is made possible through vague and malleable approval
standards.
i.

School-Opt Out Takes that Power and Amplifies It
Further

School districts facing a new TIF development have a bakedin incentive to maximize their return on their forced investment in
the TIF district. There is evidence that not all TIF districts
guarantee school district revenue will increase in any substantial
way.139 This result is especially true in more suburban or rural
school districts.140 Scholars have argued school opt-out, like that
proposed in H.B. 31, fails to consider the simple fact that a TIF’s
“effect is not consistent across the board.” 141 This opt-out gives
schools the incentive to ensure their concerns are noted and
considered throughout the TIF approval process, and, in states that
allow it, opt-out of the TIF district if these concerns are not
addressed. In theory this practice should apply to all school
districts, both affluent and distressed. Yet, as explained above,
developers’ economic goals must be met as well. As such, larger TIF
districts with greater returns on investment tend to pop up in more
affluent regions.142 It is impossible for distressed school districts to
oppose proposed TIF districts if few developers want to begin a TIF
development within their district. While school opt-out nominally
applies to all school districts regardless of economic health,
practically, it is only a tool for affluent districts.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra text accompanying notes 28–31.
See supra text accompanying notes 89–97.
Id.
Weber et al., supra note 53, at 35–36.
Id. at 39.
Coffin, supra note 78, at 78.
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Kansas Schools Have Been Eager to Use Their Veto
Power

The Meadowbrook Redevelopment TIF provides an example of
an affluent school district using the clout of a potential veto to seek
a more favorable TIF development plan. Meadowbrook sits within
the district boundaries of Shawnee Mission, an affluent school
district primarily in Johnson County that encompasses part of
fourteen municipalities to the southwest of Kansas City.143 The
district is predominately White.144 As of late, Shawnee Mission has
become more willing to exercise, or at the very least threaten use of,
their power under Kan. Stat. section 12-1771(d).145 This veto threat
was the case during the approval of the Meadowbrook
Redevelopment TIF. Then superintendent Jim Hinson stated the
district would oppose any TIF development that would “drive up
enrollment and put a strain on the district’s budget . . . .”146
The school district eventually relented and allowed the
Meadowbrook Redevelopment, as well as other development
projects, to proceed.147 However, in order to gain the school district’s
support, the developers negotiated with the school district.148 These
negotiations ensured the TIF would end as soon as the financing for
the park was paid off, which developers expect to be sooner than the
approved twenty years.149 In addition, developers left open the
possibility of an “environmental lab” in the park for use by district
schools.150 These concessions from the developer highlight that only
an affluent school district like Shawnee Mission has the ability and
clout to utilize the power under section 12-1771(d) of the Kansas
Code.151
143. About, SHAWNEE MISSION SCH. DIST., https://www.smsd.org/about [https://p
erma.cc/LLD6-PN83] (“The district is consistently ranked among the finest school
districts nationwide for its high student performance. Shawnee Mission serves a
diverse student population from 14 cities within northeast Johnson County,
Kansas.”).
144. See Education Demographics and Geographic Estimates, NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/Programs/Edge/ACSDashboard/2011640 [https://p
erma.cc/8S2P-WYUY] (stating that the Shawnee Mission School District is 81%
White).
145. See Hammill, supra note 14. (noting that the Shawnee Mission School
District had met twice to discuss vetoing a TIF).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018).
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To be fair, some Missouri schools have used their clout to
pressure developers of proposed TIF districts for more favorable
development plans.152 For example, in St. Charles, a middle-class
suburb to the northwest of St. Louis, the St. Charles School District
raised concerns about increased enrollment due to a twenty-sevenacre proposed TIF development near the banks of the Missouri
River.153 To assuage concerns, representatives of both the city TIF
commission as well as the developer of the site met with school
board officials to understand their concerns and seek their input. 154
The St. Charles School District’s actions arguably undermine the
thesis of this Note as it shows school districts in Missouri are
already using their clout to seek more desirable TIF developments,
therefore rendering Missouri H.B. 31 useless. 155
Yet this argument misses the point. This Note argues that
Missouri H.B. 31 would accelerate the resource gap between
affluent and distressed school districts. 156 It is one thing for the St.
Charles School District to raise concerns about a proposed TIF
development without any real power to do something about it. It is
another thing altogether for the school district to threaten to optout of the TIF development completely. Further, if Missouri school
districts could opt-out of TIF districts, it would be reasonable to
assume more school districts would follow the lead of the St. Charles
School District and be more vocal about their concerns.
C.

Distressed Municipalities Focus on TIFs that Increase
Population Without Increased School Funding

Less consequentially, as distressed municipalities are focused
on residential TIFs, the number of students in distressed school
districts will increase.157 This increase in enrollment will likely
outpace any increase in school funding through increased property
tax revenue. As stated above, more distressed municipalities tend
to focus on residential development.158 These distressed
municipalities aim to use TIFs to either ease a trend of people

152. Kaatmann, supra note 45. (“[T]he developer would give the St. Charles
School District $1.25 million in lieu of new tax revenue that would be diverted to the
TIF fund.”).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
156. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
157. This is a concern for affluent schools as well.
158. Coffin, supra note 78, at 77–78.
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moving out of the municipality, or, more importantly, attract new
residents. At least some of these new residents will likely have
school-age children, thus increasing enrollment.
The concern for increased enrollment was part of the reason
Shawnee Mission threatened to veto the Meadowbrook TIF. 159 This
increase in enrollment because of a residential TIF development
comes at a time when school funding is frozen. This means that
schools must do more with the same amount of revenue. This might
not impact affluent schools, but for distressed schools barely
hanging on it could lead to disastrous consequences. 160 While
affluent school districts see their revenues increase without any
corresponding enrollment increase, distressed schools might see
their revenues increase while their enrollment increases. Assuming
that school opt-out is practically a tool for affluent school districts
alone, these distressed districts are unable to adequately assert
their economic needs while affluent districts are able to haggle with
developers.161 This, again, would grant economic power to affluent
school districts at the expense of distressed districts, further
accelerating the resource gap.
V. Missouri H.B. 31 Fails to Address Regional Division and
the Underlying Structural Problems of Missouri’s TIF
Statute
As explained in the section above, TIFs generally exacerbate
the resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts. 162
A second argument against the proposed school opt-out in Missouri
H.B. 31 is that the proposal simply layers another decision-making
body on top of the already complex and fractured TIF approval
process, while ultimately doing nothing to address this byzantine
maze.
A.

The Mini-Municipality Problem

This Note focuses on TIF use in Missouri, and, in particular,
the St. Louis metropolitan area. This is for two reasons. First, the
159. Hammill, supra note 14 (noting that Superintendent Hinson said that the
financing arrangement will increase enrollment, straining the school district’s
budget).
160. See Weber, supra note 129, at 634 (stating that school districts “starting off
with more poor children enrolled in a district slows the growth in property tax
revenues” that come with a TIF redevelopment).
161. See discussion supra Section IV.B.i.
162. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
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St. Louis region utilizes TIFs far more than anywhere else in the
state.163 Second, the proposed changes to Missouri’s TIF statute
would have the greatest impact on the St. Louis region. This is
primarily due to St. Louis’ mini-municipality problem. After the
City of St. Louis split from St. Louis County during political
uncertainty following the Civil War, small municipalities began
popping up throughout the region.164 The number of municipalities
peaked at ninety-eight in 1952 and has since fallen to eightyeight.165 This may not seem that extreme, but, in comparison,
Johnson County, Kansas (where Kansas City, Kansas is located)
contains twenty municipalities in only a slightly smaller area. 166
In an effort to increase their tax bases, these small
municipalities must fight with each other to attract new developers.
Recognizing that anything can be considered “blighted” under
section 99.810.1(1) of the Missouri Code, municipalities turn to
TIFs.167 Far too often, Luce explains, municipalities view TIFs as a
“zero-sum” competition—if I get the new Walmart development
then my neighbor will not. 168 This fuels unnecessary competition

163. THOMAS LUCE, RECLAIMING THE INTENT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE
KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2003).
164. See St. Louis County Sees Dwindling Number of Municipalities, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (July 1, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missour
i/articles/2018-07-01/st-louis-county-sees-dwindling-number-of-municipalities [http
s://perma.cc/9L3S-2PTK], and Tim O’Neil, Aug. 22, 1876: How the “Great Divorce” of
St. Louis City and St. Louis County Started, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 22,
2016), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/aug-how-the-great-divorce-of-st-louiscity-and/article_3e93fa29-7d01-570d-94f2-31eca08a9378.html [https://perma.cc/RD
8L-UMUA]. Post-Civil War, the City of St. Louis was growing at a much faster pace
than the rest of St. Louis County. To avoid county taxes and “redundant”
government, the City proposed becoming independent. Id. After going to the polls,
and then to court to contest supposed irregularities, the measure passed. Id. At the
time the City was economically superior. Id. Today, after several failed attempts at
reconciliation, the City is attempting to rejoin St. Louis County. Jack Grone, City,
Meet County: St. Louis Weighs Historic Merger, CITYLAB (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/01/st-louis-missouri-city-county-consolidationvote-2020/579436/ [https://perma.cc/5ULV-AT3Y]. For a whole host of reasons (many
economic, but also racial) County citizens are vehemently opposed to such a merger.
Id.
165. St. Louis County Sees Dwindling Number of Municipalities, supra note 164.
166. Johnson County, Kansas has an area of 477 square miles. Fast Facts,
JOHNSON COUNTY KAN. (2018), https://www.jocogov.org/government/about-johnsoncounty/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/G53P-7XKG]. St. Louis County, Missouri has an
area of 507 square miles. U.S. Census QuickFacts on St. Louis County, Missouri,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/stlouiscountymissouri [htt
ps://perma.cc/ML5V-GT45].
167. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(1) (West 2016); LUCE, supra note 163, at v.
168. LUCE, supra note 163, at v.
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between municipalities and only serves to further fracture the
region.
These mini-municipalities are so small that the “copycat”
syndrome that so-often plagues states with TIF statutes is made
even worse.169 Briffault likened this copycat syndrome to the
political science classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. 170 It is in the region’s
best interest if each municipality coordinates with each other
regarding economic development. This cooperation ensures that
municipalities receive necessary property tax revenue while
preventing unnecessary competition over proposed redevelopment
projects. Regional cooperation would also cull the race to the bottom
wherein municipalities offer unsustainable, unreasonable, and
unpopular incentives along with the proposed TIF district to entice
companies to move within their borders. 171
Redevelopment, for good or (mostly) for ill, is seen as a zerosum game.172 One store usually can service the needs of several
municipalities. This is especially so the more fractured the region
is. The market simply cannot support a Walmart or Target in each
of the eighty-eight municipalities in St. Louis County, but can
reasonably support around a dozen stores.173 The competition for
these stores leads to humorous results. In 2010, a Walmart location
straddling the boundary of St. Ann and Bridgeton moved two miles
169. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 90 (2010) (“Even if it
is not clear how well TIF works, if other localities are already using it, any locality
also interested in promoting tax base growth is likely to be drawn to it, and to use it
in areas where it is most likely to add to the tax base.”).
170. Id. at 92. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a political science thought experiment
illustrating that two rational actors will not necessarily cooperate with each other
even when it is in their best interests to do so. Jim Chappelow, Prisoner’s Dilemma,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prisoners-dilemma.asp [htt
ps://perma.cc/R9AT-939P].
171. While not directly analogous, look only to Wisconsin’s ludicrous tax rebate
offer to Foxconn for their U.S. headquarters. Andrew Liptak, Foxconn Might Slow
Hiring at its Wisconsin Plant, VERGE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/1/19/18189480/foxconn-wisconsin-plant-possible-hiring-slowdown-jobs [https://
perma.cc/8VZ6-ZN78].
172. LUCE, supra note 163, at v.
173. There are currently ten Target stores and ten Walmart stores in St. Louis
County. Number of Target locations in St. Louis County, Missouri, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (follow the hyperlink, then search “Target near St. Louis
County, Missouri” and then count the number of Target stores within the boundaries
of St. Louis County) [https://perma.cc/WHX5-4XG8]; Number of Walmart locations
in St. Louis County, Missouri, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow
hyperlink, then search “Walmart near St. Louis County, Missouri” and then count
the number of Walmart stores within the boundaries of St. Louis County)
[https://perma.cc/CU26-MN8N].
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down the road to a new location completely within Bridgeton. 174 The
impetus for the move? Bridgeton set up a TIF in the new location.175
School districts, especially in the St. Louis region, necessarily
overlap municipal boundaries. The above-described Walmart
moved from one municipality to another but remained within the
boundaries of the Pattonville School District. 176 The Pattonville
School District could not care less which municipality has the
nearest Walmart, and the infighting between the two
municipalities cost the district millions of dollars over the life of the
TIF.177 This infighting lead one municipality to offer TIF funding to
lure the Walmart fully within their borders,178 which led to less
money being directed to the school district.
To be fair, many of these smaller municipalities in St. Louis
County are relatively inconsequential. For example, the city of
Champ, Missouri boasts thirteen residents 179—hardly making it a
redevelopment juggernaut. However, the sheer number of
municipalities fuels factionalism in the region and intensifies the
competition for big box stores, shopping malls, and office space. 180
Overlay one school district’s boundary lines, which in St. Louis
County necessarily contains pieces of sometimes as many as a dozen
municipalities,181 and you are left with a school district being held
hostage as municipalities race to the bottom in order to score a new
development through TIF funding. While TIFs already cause
conflict over what is typically seen as a zero-sum game,182 the sheer
number of actors in the St. Louis region intensify this
competition.183 Any TIF reforms in Missouri must take this minimunicipality problem into account. Missouri already attempted to

174. Logan, supra note 15.
175. Id.
176. District Boundaries, PATTONVILLE SCH. DIST, https://www.psdr3.org/district
[https://perma.cc/M2DC-7ZDX].
177. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2016 TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI:
LOCAL TIF PROJECT INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL DATA 108–09 (2017) (listing the
amount of revenue in the Manchester Highlands TIF fund as $7,892,078.00).
178. Logan, supra note 15.
179. U.S. Census Community Facts for Champ, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/place/Champvillage, Missouri/POPULA
TION/DECENNIAL_CNT [https://perma.cc/KPC6-L3ML].
180. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 61; Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 55.
181. Interactive Map of the Parkway School District, PARKWAY SCH. DIST., http://
www.pkwy.k12.mo.us/map/parkway_Map.cfm [https://perma.cc/6CKF-KMVD].
182. See LUCE, supra note 163, at v.
183. Logan, supra note 15.
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do this through the establishment of the county TIF commissions, 184
but these commissions have fatal flaws that undermine their
positive benefit.185
B.

Missouri House Bill 1, Missouri House Bill 1434, and
Missouri’s Attempt to Rectify the Mini-Municipality
Problem

In spite of growing bipartisan calls to reform Missouri’s
underlying TIF statutes, the Missouri General Assembly has been
slow to address the serious concerns regarding the lax TIF
standards outlined above. To date there have been two major TIF
reform bills passed in Missouri since the original bill was passed in
1982.186 The Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (H.B.
1) in 2008, which attempted to provide additional oversight and
stifle the growing competition for TIF redevelopment projects
between municipalities.187 The bill took the power to appoint TIF
commissions out of the hands of municipalities in three counties (St.
Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson) and created county-wide
commissions instead.188 The rationale appears sound—a countywide commission has no allegiance to a specific municipality and
should approve TIFs that have the greatest positive impact on the
region as a whole. This plan, however, had serious shortcomings.
The most serious—the municipality’s veto power—was briefly
explained above in the procedural requirements to approve a TIF
district.189 After the commission makes their recommendation,
municipalities can veto their findings with a two-thirds vote.190
Municipalities have not been shy in exercising this override
power.191 What is the point of a county-wide TIF commission if you
allow the municipality to simply override any decision they make
with an easily attainable majority? As Coleman and Murphy
explain, the average number of members in a municipality’s

184. See discussion supra Section IV.A.ii.
185. Id.
186. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.B. 1434, 98th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016); H.B. 1600, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016).
187. Mo. Governor’s Message (June 29, 2016).
188. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008).
189. See Hammill, supra note 14.
190. Id.
191. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 227 (“The city of Ellisville did override
the county TIF Commission in 2012 adopting an $11 million TIF for a Wal-Mart
store.”).
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governing body in St. Louis County is six. 192 To attain a two-thirds
majority, all the average municipality needs are four votes instead
of the usual three. And this vote would “override a 9- or 12-person
panel charged with watching over interests larger than those of a
single county or municipality.”193 Yet, ten years after this reform
was passed, there has been no new legislation significantly
reforming this veto system, even as calls for abolishing this veto
power—by academics and politicians alike—have grown.194
Second, and more substantially, in 2016, Missouri House Bill
1434 (H.B. 1434) authorized consequences for municipalities that
went against the recommendation of the county-wide TIF
commission.195 These punishments are relatively severe and were
passed with widespread bipartisan support. 196 If a municipality
overrides the TIF commission’s rejection, the TIF funding will be
limited to “acquisition of land and other property, real or personal,
or rights or interests therein . . . [d]emolition of buildings; and [t]he
clearing and grading of land.”197 These restrictions greatly limit
where TIF money can go and, in theory, should prevent
municipalities from simply overriding the county TIF commissions
without recourse. Because this reform is still relatively new, it is
hard to study its impact, but there are some signs the reforms are
effective. The Municipal League of St. Louis, which represents most
municipalities in St. Louis County, opposed this reform, stating it
would usurp the power of municipalities and undermine the
original intent of TIF funding.198 Yet, that seems to be the point.
This reform might address the issues of competition that authors
like Weber believe “strain[s] interjurisdictional relations because it
grants one taxing body (the municipality) the authority to deny
192. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11.
193. Id.
194. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11–12; Mason & Thomas, supra note
21, at 226–27; cf. VanDyke, supra note 105, at 805–06 (arguing that TIF commissions
must be more selective in their approvals to ensure they are not “swayed by the glitz
and glamour of major developers or franchise operations that promise hundreds of
jobs and millions of sales.”).
195. Mo. Governor’s Message (June 29, 2016).
196. MO. H. JOURNAL, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 3601–03 (2016) (indicating the
bill passed 114-37).
197. H.B. 1434, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016); H.B. 1600,
98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016)
198. Mark Schlinkmann, Legislature Passes New Restrictions on TIF Incentives to
Developers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 13, 2016), https://www.stltoday.com/n
ews/local/govt-and-politics/legislature-passes-new-restrictions-on-tif-incentives-todevelopers/article_937ff4eb-9330-5c75-bed4-3873ff1dc3ec.html [https://perma.cc/2G
RQ-UUF5].
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other taxing bodies access to new property value growth.” 199 This
Note argues, and some concur,200 that no TIF reform is more
important than further curtailing municipalities’ veto power.
C.

Missouri H.B. 31 Attempts to Solve This Issue, but Once
Again Misses the Mark

Proponents of the reforms in H.B. 31 argue this is exactly the
situation that school opt-out is meant to rectify. Yet, looking at the
history of TIF laws in Missouri shows this is a misguided
assumption. To see this, one only needs to look to the other veto
already in place.201 Municipalities already have the power to veto
the decision of the county TIF commissions with a two-thirds vote
of the city council.202 While there are consequences in place for
municipalities that exercise this option, this veto power has been
widely criticized and other papers have called for its elimination. 203
The goal of the county TIF commissions was to curb unnecessary
competition between small, symbiotic municipalities by placing
some of the TIF decision making process in the hands of a regional
body. There, the commission could consider regional factors and
utilize TIFs in a way more in line with their original intent. These
commissions were also designed to comprise representatives from
all concerned parties.204
If there are calls to abolish the veto power of municipalities, it
therefore makes little sense that, in order to reform Missouri’s TIF
system, the state needs to expand the use of one of the most
maligned aspects of the current statutory scheme to schools. 205 This
can lead to one of two situations.
199. Weber et al., supra note 53, at 37.
200. See Nguyen-Hoang, supra note 130, at 537 (suggesting reforming TIF
programs by allowing school districts to opt in or out of TIF plans as well as
reinstating the “but-for” test as a condition for TIF program approval); COLEMAN &
MURPHY, supra note 42, at 14 (advocating for more stringent approval requirements
for TIF program implementation and elimination of sales tax revenues for TIF
programs); Logan, supra note 15 (arguing that instead of bringing retail stores and
jobs to communities, TIF programs can and should incentivize constructing office
buildings and factories, which would bring new and better paying jobs to
communities).
201. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008).
202. Id.
203. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 225.
204. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.2(1) (West 2016).
205. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 227 (“Several St. Louis interviewees
suggested that these county TIF Commissions should be strengthened to make it
even more difficult for a city to adopt a TIF proposal that the commission has ruled
against.”).
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First, if H.B. 31 is adopted it would layer another map of school
district boundaries on top of the municipal map. This in turn would
lead to increased fracturing of the region, which can only make the
mini-municipality problem worse.206 There is an argument that this
would require the building of greater consensus and this kind of
system—with municipalities and schools able to check each other
and the county commission—encourages more mundane TIF
districts. However, this consensus must come on a regional (either
county or joint-county) level. This kind of system might work in a
more unified region with fewer municipalities and school districts,
but given the sheer number of municipalities and school districts,
this layering will simply pit municipalities against the county, or
against school districts and so on.207 If the factionalism built into
Missouri’s TIF scheme fuels the resource gap between affluent and
distressed schools, increased factionalism will make it worse.
An example TIF from Missouri that illustrates this
conundrum is the Manchester Highlands TIF. 208 In 2005, the City
of Manchester, Missouri, designated the “Highway 141/Manchester
Road Redevelopment Area.” This TIF was ultimately approved
because the “[p]roject had unusual/extraordinary costs that made
the project financially unfeasible in the market place [and] required
significant public infrastructure investment.” 209 The Manchester
Highlands TIF poached a Walmart from a different municipality a
few miles away.210 In addition to the Walmart, there are several
other big box and multi-use stores, including a Nordstrom Rack and
Best Buy.211 As of publication, there are seven years left before the
TIF district expires.212
This TIF district sits within the boundaries of the Parkway
School District that is fairly analogous to the Shawnee Mission
School District discussed in the subsection above. Parkway School
District primarily covers the St. Louis suburbs of Chesterfield,
Creve Coeur, Manchester, Maryland Heights, and Town and
206. Coffin, supra note 78, at 61.
207. Id. at 61.
208. Manchester Highlands, VEREIT, http://www.shopmanchesterhighlands.com/
[https://perma.cc/WE49-P98M].
209. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 177.
210. This behavior seems to be a recurring theme. See Logan, supra note 15.
211. The development site lists each of the stores in the development on their
home page. Manchester Highlands, VEREIT, http://www.shopmanchesterhighlands.c
om/ [https://perma.cc/WE49-P98M].
212. At the time the 2016 TIF report was published the TIF still had 11 years
until retirement. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 177.
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Country.213 Each of these suburbs is located in what is colloquially
called “West County,” a well-to-do business hub of the St. Louis
region.214 The district is primarily White (80%), with a sizeable
Asian student population (9%) as well, and a median household
income of $115,947 for households with children in public school.215
The Manchester Highlands TIF was not approved without
controversy.216 As the TIF was approved in 2005 and later amended
in 2007, the county TIF commissions were not yet in place. 217
However, the controversy over the Manchester Highlands TIF
approval illustrates how a fractured region leads to unnecessary
competition and animosity.
Second, allowing school districts to opt-out—and essentially
kill TIF projects—negates any improvement that could be made by
eliminating municipalities’ ability to veto the county TIF
commission’s recommendations. While not nearly as numerous as
the number of municipalities in St. Louis County, there are still
twenty-four school districts within the county boundaries. 218 Even
worse, some school districts like the Parkway School District cover
wide swaths of land while others like the Bayless School district
cover small parcels of land.219 Any increase in regional cooperation
brought about by removing the municipal veto would simply be

213. Interactive Map of the Parkway School District, PARKWAY SCH. DIST., http://
www.pkwy.k12.mo.us/map/parkway_Map.cfm [https://perma.cc/6CKF-KMVD].
214. West County, URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.p
hp?term=west%20county [https://perma.cc/4PWH-6LP4] (“The suburban region
west of the city of St. Louis. Includes the municipalities of Clayton, Ladue, Creve
Coeur, Olivette, University City, Chesterfield, Ballwin, Wildwood.”).
215. ACS-ED: District Demographic Dashboard 2013–17 for Parkway School
District, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/acsdashboar
d# (to see specific district data type “Parkway C-2” into the search bar labeled “Begin
Your Search”) [https://perma.cc/JTC4-5JY3].
216. See Adams v. City of Manchester, 242 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming a grant of summary judgement in favor of the City of Manchester in a
dispute over whether the City accurately applied the statutory cost-benefit analysis
in approving the Manchester Highlands TIF); see Mary Shapiro, Board Approves
Revised Plan for Manchester Highlands, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 13, 2007),
https://www.stltoday.com/suburban-journals/board-approves-revised-plan-for-manc
hester-highlands/article_e4012c87-76e9-5b5a-873a-052e8f916487.html [https://per
ma.cc/J5US-6TX9] (“However, the [Manchester Highlands] project has been delayed
by lawsuits filed by a handful of residents, as well as efforts to complete land
acquisitions.”).
217. H.B. 1 was passed in 2008. H.B. 1, 94th General Assemb., 1st Sess. §§
99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008).
218. School District Map, supra note 95.
219. Id.
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absorbed by the school districts if they gain the ability to opt-out of
any proposed TIF.
VI. State Funding Fails to Fill in the Gaps Left by TIF
Districts
Before addressing any proposed solution, it bears quick
mention of one complicating factor not addressed thus far in this
Note. Many states, but not Missouri, allow for increased school aid
to fill in the funding gaps left by open TIF districts. 220 This would
seem to solve the problem as it gives schools no monetary incentive
to opt-out of proposed TIFs. Yet, this temporary aid does not matter
for the thesis of this Note. School aid to fill funding gaps is great
and used in many locations.221 This school aid can offset the short
term lost revenue from TIF projects, but TIF districts are, by design,
temporally limited. The TIF district will eventually expire and this
increased school aid will vanish along with it. At that point the
school district will need to rely on whatever property tax revenue is
brought in by the finished TIF development, and, as explained
repeatedly throughout this Note, TIFs often do not create new
property tax revenue.
VII.
Proposed Solution: Appointments Reallocation and
Narrow School Opt-Outs
There is no silver bullet to solve all of TIF’s problems.
Hundreds of pages have been written on various issues with the
current structure of TIFs in Missouri. 222 Yet, Missouri has already
demonstrated a willingness to meaningfully reform TIFs in a way

220. Schools Historically Have Little Power in TIF Decisions, JEFFERSON CITY
NEWS TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.newstribune.com/news/story/story/2016/Ap
r/10/schools-historically-have-little-power-tif-decisio/546916/ [https://perma.cc/D5Q
G-S5XG] (“Some states provide additional state aid to districts with TIFs to
replenish some of the revenue the district would otherwise receive from property
taxes. However, Missouri does not make up for the revenue lost from TIFs, said
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education spokesperson Sarah Potter.”).
221. Missouri Courts interpret the legislative intent of these state aid statutes to
“at least partially equalize the relative disparity in wealth between affluent and less
affluent school districts.” State ex rel. Sch. Dist. v. Young, 519 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975).
222. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 91, at 1019; Williams, supra note 91, at 255
(discussing different issues plaguing Missouri’s TIF statute).
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that bring them more in line with their original purpose. 223
However, the current reforms don’t go far enough. Furthermore, the
proposed reforms in H.B. 31, in particular school-opt out, will
further fuel unnecessary competition between municipalities, breed
hostility between municipalities and school districts, and increase
the resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts. 224
The 94th Missouri General Assembly clearly wanted to stifle
competition between municipalities for TIFs when they instituted
county-wide TIF commissions in the St. Louis metropolitan area. 225
However, the breakdown of the membership of these commissions
skews heavily towards the county and municipalities, with few
members coming from school districts or other services that receive
property tax income.226 As it stands, these county TIF commissions
have twelve members.227 The appointment of commissioners is as
follows: six by the county executive, three by municipalities that
utilize TIFs, two by the school boards of the county, and one by other
agencies that receive property tax revenue.228
Instead of adding more seats, appointments to the county TIF
commissions should merely be reallocated. The county school
boards should appoint four members instead of two, with the
additional two seats being taken from the seats allocated to the
county executive. This allocation more accurately recognizes the
role of all of the interested players. The county is important and, as
such, has the most seats. If going any further, one runs the risk of
weakening the influence of the county too much, negating the entire
purpose of the county TIF commission. Public schools receive most
of their funding through property taxes.229 It makes sense, then,
that when discussing the allocation of property tax revenue, the
schools should have quite a bit of say. Having a full third of the
county TIF commission seats grants them that authority while not
allowing them to simply veto any TIF with which they disagree.
Further, the seats allocated to the school districts should be
split. Two of the seats should be appointed by affluent school

223. See discussion supra Section I.D.
224. See discussion supra Section IV.A.i.
225. H.B. 1, 94th General Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008).
226. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.3(1) (West 2016).
227. Id. §§ 99.820.3(1) (a)–(d).
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., PARKWAY SCH. DIST., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
7 (2015) (“The largest source of revenue for the District continues to be locally
assessed property taxes.”).
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districts and two by distressed school districts. How to demarcate
“economic distress” would be up to the state. This increased school
district representation, with increased diversity in who occupies the
seats allocated to the school board, will give the schools increased
say in how TIFs are administered while considering the needs of
different kinds of school districts. This theory appears to be the
rationale behind the school opt-out proposal in H.B. 31.
This reallocation, however, does not share the same negative
consequences of school opt-out.230 Reallocation provides school
districts with more influence over how TIFs are approved while
preventing them from single-handedly preventing any TIF they do
not like. In addition, by ensuring there is diversity in type of school
district represented, the county TIF commissions consider the needs
of both affluent and distressed school districts without allowing one
kind of district to overpower the other.
Next, the ability of municipalities to veto the decision of a TIF
commission should be further curtailed. If the municipality can
easily veto a decision by the county TIF commission, then what’s
the point? The Missouri General Assembly has already limited the
power of the municipal veto by curtailing the use of TIF funds in
the event a municipality vetoes.231 Simply abolishing the veto
altogether would prove deeply controversial and appears to
undermine TIF’s goal of local control over land redevelopment.
Instead, keeping in mind Coleman and Murphy’s observation that
the current two-thirds majority is too easy to attain, the bar for a
municipality to veto the commission should be raised.232 Instead of
a two-thirds majority, the municipality’s governing body must
unanimously vote to override the county TIF commission’s
recommendation. This structure makes overriding the county TIF
commission’s recommendation difficult but not impossible. It also
ensures that there is still a sense of local control over the TIF
approval process.233
230. Weber et al., supra note 53, at 35–36; see discussion supra Sections I.D,
IV.A.i; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018).
231. H.B. 1434, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016); H.B. 1600,
98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016).
232. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11.
233. This reform might also persuade the county commissions to implement,
without statutory changes, an increased blight standard for their own internal
review of TIF proposals. This unilateral change in approval standards seems to be
the underlying purpose of the county commissions in general. Message from Jay
Nixon, Governor of Missouri, to the East-West Gateway Council of Governments
(June 29, 2016) (on file with author). It is true that the county commissions could
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Finally, county TIF commissions should be expanded to the
Kansas City Metropolitan Area, in particular Jackson, Clay, and
Platte counties. These three counties comprise most of the urban
and suburban core of Kansas City within Missouri. As explained
above, Kansas City has been less enthusiastic in their use of TIF
funding for redevelopment which led to their exclusion from the
2008 bill instituting county TIF commissions. 234 It makes sense,
though, for there to be consistency in Missouri’s TIF laws. In
addition, a change in municipal governance might lead to more
aggressive use of TIF districts in the Kansas City area.
The second recommendation is to implement school opt-out in
a far narrower sense than that proposed by H.B. 31. States like
Minnesota grant only schools a veto power for only TIF proposals
involving housing redevelopments.235 As these types of TIFs tend to
be proposed in distressed municipalities, the power would primarily
be wielded by distressed school districts. 236 As such, this reform
might narrow the resource gap. It would allow distressed school
districts to forgo further economic development while using a steady
stream of property tax revenue to improve the fiscal condition of
their school district. Simply put, it gives fiscal control back to
distressed school districts.
It is important to emphasize what this Note is not advocating
for. It is not advocating for the outright abolition of TIFs. TIFs,
when done well, can make a marked change to an otherwise
abandoned piece of property.237 They are intended to provide the
simply do this now without the reform, but increased pressure from school-districtappointed commission members might make it politically viable for the commission
to adopt new standards when they review proposed TIFs. Under Mo. Stat. Section
99.824.4(3), the county commission is either tasked with an up or down vote on the
proposed TIF. There is no requirement to give a formal reason for the rejection. Id.
While this meeting must be public, it allows for a potential solution to the tax blight
and “but for” tests within the current statutory framework. Id. However, there is no
current pressure for these commissions to change these standards. With more
members appointed by school boards—in particular from distressed school
districts—there might be enough internal and external pressure on the commissions
to adopt new standards.
234. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 134–136.
236. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78.
237. See generally, ST. LOUIS INNOVATION DIST., ST. LOUIS INNOVATION DISTRICT
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (TIF) REDEVELOPMENT PLAN 3 (2012) (“Not only are
structures in the Redevelopment Area old, but many are functionally obsolete. These
structures were built when the Area was largely a warehousing and manufacturing
area supported by rail service, which no longer exists.”). Today this district has been
transformed into a biotech research hub. The District, CORTEX INNOVATION CMTY.,
https://cortexstl.com/the-district/ [https://perma.cc/5H9A-MRXT].
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necessary economic spark to help areas grow and redevelop to suit
the current economic environment. Yet, more often than not, TIFs
are not done well. They have been abused by developers and
municipalities stifling economic development in truly distressed
areas. This abuse, though, does not warrant an extreme reaction
like doing away with TIFs in general. In addition, TIFs are too
popular with developers and municipalities to eliminate them. 238
Instead, it demands logical, simple reforms to the underlying TIF
statutes that redistributes power from those with means to those
without. Missouri has shown a desire to do this plan and the
reforms proposed in this Note help further that goal.
Conclusion
TIFs are not inherently bad. They have been used for valid and
important redevelopment projects.239 However, like many good
things in the United States, municipalities and developers with
deep pockets have exploited loopholes in the current statutes to
their benefit. This practice comes at the expense of both
economically distressed municipalities and school districts. There is
no question Missouri’s TIF laws need reform, especially when it
comes to the amount of say school districts have in the TIF approval
process. However, reforms proposed in H.B. 31 simply do not
address the underlying structural and economic stressors on the
current TIF system. Instead of allowing all schools to opt-out of
controversial TIF proposals, it would only realistically be an option
for affluent school districts.240 This result, in turn, widens the
resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts by
allowing affluent school districts to only approve TIFs that provide
a large enough return on investment. Further, school opt-out would
only serve to further fracture an already fragmented region,
possibly rendering any decision on TIF funding an impossible task.
The two simple reforms proposed in this Note would lessen the
problems plaguing the current TIF system in Missouri. The system
would balance the need for school districts to have a say over where
238. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 60 (“While tax increment financing is considered
a very effective (and popular) economic development tool, public officials often face
difficulties in putting it to use.”) (emphasis added); Briffault, supra note 169, at 74
(“One study of TIF in Indiana concluded that TIF may be the only politically
acceptable tool for financing infrastructure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. For example, the Cortex
Redevelopment Plan in Midtown St. Louis has brought in almost 1,000 new jobs,
$155 million in new investments and revitalized an entire neighborhood—all with
only $10 million in TIF funding. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22
240. See discussion supra Section IV.B.i.
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their funding is being sent with the needs of the municipalities to
redevelop legitimately blighted land. It increases the power of
economically distressed school districts to prevent overeager
municipalities from making rash decisions to increase the
municipality’s economic base to the detriment of the school district.
And, most importantly, it accomlishes these goals without fueling
an increase in the resource gap by redistributing some of the power
from affluent to distressed school districts.
TIFs have always been about power. Originally, they were
about local power in the face of decreasing federal funds for urban
redevelopment. Today, TIFs are about affluent regions using their
economic power to centralize high-revenue multi-use developments
within their municipal boundaries. These two proposed reforms
help restore balance to that power.

